Tanks Aren't Dead Yet: The Drone Threat and the Future of Armored Warfare

Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there have been articles speculating on the death of conventional military systems, such as the tank, in modern warfare. They argue that cheap one-way attack drones in the Ukraine war have defeated older, more expensive systems such as the German Leopard II and the American M1A1 Abrams tanks. But this argument has a logical consequence its proponents haven't addressed, that if tanks are now obsolete due to the drone threat, then the fundamental mechanism of land maneuver is broken. This would turn every conflict into a long, costly war of attrition, with soldiers unable to advance or capture an objective. It is undeniable that the introduction of drones has significantly shaped the battlefield, turning Ukraine from a war of movement into a stagnant conflict. Drones have created a transparent battle space, making it very difficult to amass military formations without being seen, and enabling precision fires, either by reconnaissance drones relaying enemy positions to artillery units or by waves of one-way FPV attack drones carrying out the attacks themselves.

Despite the current deadlock on the battlefield, the history of armored warfare suggests the tank will adapt rather than become obsolete. From Israel's adaptation to ATGMs after the Yom Kippur War to the development of active protection systems after the 2006 Lebanon War, militaries have developed technological innovations to counter threats to tanks. The era of the threat of drones will be no different, provided militaries invest in the right counter-drone systems. Current US military adaptations, such as Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) mounted on the M1E3 tank, suggest that the drone threat will be neutralized through the investment in appropriate counter-drone systems, preserving the tank's role and restoring the viability of maneuver warfare. The cycle of technological shock and adaptation is a recurring theme in military history, in which the appearance of a new weapon has been met with a defensive counter-innovation.  

One of the most prominent examples of this was during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when Israeli armor was forced to confront Egyptian and Syrian anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) such as the Soviet RPG-7 and AT-3. Both weapons employed a High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warhead that could penetrate tank armor. Israel lost around 40% of its armor in the Sinai Peninsula against Egyptian ATGMs. After 3 weeks of fighting, the Israeli’s lost approximately 800 tanks to both the Egyptian and Syrian forces. Rather than declare the tank obsolete, the Israelis adapted to the technological shift and began developing explosive reactive armor (ERA), a brick-like covering that is fitted to the entire tank. It is made from two metal plates with explosives between them that, when struck by a projectile, detonate and neutralize the incoming projectile. ERA was applied to Israeli armor during the 1982 Lebanon war, and its ability to protect armor from ATGMs in that conflict led to the Israelis being able to maneuver throughout Lebanon. Observing ERA’s performance in this conflict, other militaries, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, began adopting it for their own tanks.

However, it was not long before countermeasures to ERA were developed, and the technological shift once again favored anti-tank crews. The Soviet Union developed the RPG-29 and AT-14 E Kornet missiles, both of which employ something called a tandem warhead. Tandem warheads work by deploying one warhead to hit the ERA while the follow-on warhead hits the tank's armor underneath the ERA. These new systems saw widespread usage by Hezbollah and caused many casualties to Israeli armor in the 2006 Lebanon War. During this conflict, around 40 Israeli tanks were damaged, with 30 crew members being killed, or 25% of the total force that invaded Lebanon. Recognizing this new problem, the Israelis developed the Active Protection System (APS), also known as the Trophy System. The trophy protection system tracks and fires a projectile at incoming warheads, neutralizing them before they reach the tank. Later developments also included a soft-kill feature using infrared jammers, laser spot imitators, and radar jammers, which prevent an ATGM from obtaining a targeting lock on the tank. The active protection system has proven effective at stopping ATGMs before they reach the tank and is deployed on American and Israeli tanks today. 

Now, as in 1973 and 2006, another technological shift has occurred that favors anti-tank weapons, allowing successive waves of drones to easily destroy armor. However, the solution is not to declare the tank obsolete and disband armor formations, but to integrate emerging technologies, such as electronic warfare systems or directed energy weapons, to better protect tanks. The United States should invest in technological solutions to the drone problem rather than abandoning armor platforms entirely. The United States is already doing this by investing in the M1E3 Abrams tank, which includes a mounted CUAS turret to defend against drones. The US should adopt this and other standalone systems to create a layered drone defense network.

If the United States believes that the tank is obsolete and invests exclusively in drones while an adversary like Russia or China is successfully able to modernize their armor with counter-drone technology first, they will be able to protect themselves from drone attacks, which would enable them to maneuver their forces while our forces remain pinned down. As noted by the Modern War Institute, while drones are being used as tools of attrition, the side that successfully integrates them into a maneuver concept will be able to destroy an opposing army that remains in a defensive posture. A military that invests exclusively in drones while declaring tanks obsolete risks losing the ability to maneuver and also risks ceding that capability to an adversary, allowing the adversary to dominate the battlefield.