Beijing's Proxy: How the DPRK's Military Aid to Russia Serves China's Taiwan Strategy

Russia has turned what was initially anticipated as a “three-day” special military operation in Ukraine into an ongoing conflict for three years as of November 2025. And throughout the war, Russia has suffered substantial losses in military hardware, including artillery, tanks, and aircraft, to the point where it has resorted to fielding World War II-era equipment. It is therefore unsurprising that Moscow has sought military assistance from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Analysts remain concerned about the potential escalation of the conflict; however, it is important to note that the DPRK’s military capabilities are limited. The country’s forces largely rely on outdated equipment and obsolete weaponry, and its troops are generally considered to be poorly trained, particularly in comparison to Ukraine’s modernized, Western-aligned military. Observers may need to worry less about North Korea itself than about what Pyongyang’s behavior provides for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its approval of arms transfers. 

The DPRK has become a critical supplier of military aid to the Russian military and, for the People’s Republic of China, has allowed the PRC to keep its image as a responsible global power, challenge the US, and support the possible preparation for a future conflict over Taiwan.

In September 2022, U.S. intelligence declassified information suggesting that Russia was seeking to procure arms from North Korea to support the special military operation. It was suspected that the DPRK was supplying munitions to the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization. Approximately a year later, in October 2023, reports emerged indicating that North Korea had transferred substantial quantities of ammunition and military equipment to Russia. In 2024, according to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, the DPRK supplied Russia with approximately 9 million artillery and rocket shells and at least 100 ballistic missiles. They also included weapons like the 170 mm self-propelled guns, 240 mm rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, and over 200 military vehicles. In addition to lethal aid, the DPRK has deployed an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk Oblast and has been acknowledged by both Moscow and Pyongyang. Ultimately, these transfers of personnel and military hardware are highly unprecedented. The DPRK has traditionally stockpiled its weapons for the defense of the peninsula against South Korean and U.S. forces, so providing such substantial quantities to Russia indicates a notable shift in its strategic priorities.

It is highly doubtful that Pyongyang conducted transfers without China’s explicit approval. Such a move represents a sharp escalation both in the war in Ukraine and on the Korean Peninsula, and the DPRK remains one of China’s closest allies. And direct evidence of authorization has been seen, according to satellite imagery, with transfers of North Korean aid to Russia observed passing through Chinese ports. But why would China want this when it has so carefully cultivated an image as a responsible, peace-seeking global power? The answer lies in the utility that Pyongyang provides. On November 21, 2025, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated that China has never provided and does not provide lethal weapons to any party to the conflict, emphasizing that the government strictly controls the export of military products and dual-use goods. While its claim regarding lethal aid may be accurate, as in May 2024, British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps asserted that U.S. and British intelligence had evidence of lethal aid flowing from China to Russia, a claim challenged by former U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan, who said no such direct aid had been observed, it falsely claims to strictly regulate the export of military and dual-use items. China has provided critical support that has helped Moscow mitigate the impact of Western sanctions and continues to provide critical dual-use goods like semiconductors, microelectronics, and machine tools. Exports exceeding $300 million monthly have helped Russia sustain and expand its production of warfighting material. 

This is where North Korea comes in to assist the PRC’s efforts to support Russia. Beijing cannot risk the international backlash of overt military assistance, as openly supplying Moscow could trigger secondary sanctions and undermine China’s carefully maintained image as a neutral advocate for peace amid scrutiny from the U.S. and Europe. China’s leadership is aware that its strong economy is largely driven by trade with the West. This is why China tolerates changes for the DPRK’s strategic priorities. By allowing the DPRK to supply Russia instead, it provides Beijing with a political shield. Pyongyang, already heavily sanctioned and diplomatically isolated, absorbs the condemnation, while China retains plausible deniability. Beijing can materially benefit from Russia’s strengthened position without incurring the diplomatic or economic costs of acting openly.

Answering the question of why the PRC needs to supply Russia with lethal aid requires considering its plans for Taiwan. Ukraine and Taiwan share important geopolitical similarities. Both are democracies in strategically vital regions facing existential threats from larger authoritarian neighbors, Russia and China, each of which claims them as part of its historical sphere of influence. Ukraine and Taiwan rely heavily on the United States and its allies for security. However, Taiwan would present challenges far more complex than those encountered in Ukraine. The Taiwan Strait is a natural barrier, requiring any invasion to be amphibious, which would make an invasion more daunting than Russia’s largely land-based campaign. So to avoid replicating Russia’s embarrassing operational failures, China must study the war extensively. But China will have the advantage of years of observable data, and the longer the war lasts, the more lessons Beijing can learn while also diverting US attention to Europe. However, Russia has sustained significant military and human losses in its war against Ukraine, with casualties nearing 1 million. The Putin regime faces a growing budget deficit, rising inflation, and slowing civilian and industrial growth. Russia's capacity to sustain its military operations remains uncertain, which is why the PRC seeks to provide military assistance to extend the conflict.

Although many experts view a full-scale invasion as unlikely in the immediate future, U.S. defense and intelligence officials have consistently reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. Taiwan’s military has similarly flagged 2027 as a plausible timeframe for a major invasion. China has conducted a series of military drills around Taiwan in recent years. And, using its stronger-than-ever partnership with Russia, an analysis of leaked documents by the Royal United Services Institute has revealed that Russia has agreed to supply China with a comprehensive package of military equipment designed to enhance its airborne invasion capabilities. The package includes 37 BMD-4M assault vehicles, 11 Sprut-SDM1 anti-tank guns, 11 BTR-MDM APCs, several Rubin/KSHM-E command vehicles, Rheostat artillery command vehicles, and Orlan-10 UAVs. Russia also trained Chinese forces in advanced air-drop and covert infiltration tactics. And as the RUSI authors note, Russia increasingly views a Taiwan crisis as an opportunity that could weaken Western economic leverage and cement a deepened Sino-Russian bloc. 

In assessing whether the arms deals signal the emergence of a true counterweight to NATO and the U.S.-led alliance network in the Pacific, it is essential to base predictions on historical examples and a look into other aspects of Sino-Russian relations. The Soviet-Chinese partnership of the Cold War, once strong, ultimately collapsed into armed confrontation. Ideological connection and hostility towards the West do not guarantee lasting unity. More recently, reports of Chinese espionage against Russia have exposed the mistrust between the two powers. Leaked documents indicate that Russia’s Federal Security Service views Beijing as a significant intelligence threat, a perception reinforced by repeated accusations that China has stolen Russian military technology through espionage and cyber attacks. Over the past two decades, at least 21 documented incidents have reportedly targeted sensitive sectors such as aerospace and advanced laser systems. These longstanding fractures create openings for the United States to leverage divisions between the world’s two largest authoritarian powers. Doing so demands management of the risks posed by China’s regional ambitions, including its influence over Pyongyang. While an anti-Western alliance appears to be emerging, its internal tensions limit its ability to mount a united challenge to the West.