The Trump Administration Should Think Again About Ideological alignment in Europe

The Trump administration released its National Security Strategy early in December 2025. In it, the administration railed against the European Union and claimed Europe faced "civilizational erasure.” There were clear parallels in this rhetoric and many of the far-right populist parties in Europe. On both sides of the Atlantic, the populist right loathes immigration and argue that their respective countries must reclaim their former glory. Trump's ideological favorites, however, present a problem; one that could sabotage his broader strategic goals.

President Trump has been tougher on European allies than his predecessor since returning to office in January. While the headlines have been focused on his tariffs, he has also called on NATO allies to boost defense spending and to increase burden-sharing. Indeed, this is not without reason. At the end of October this year, the administration ordered 700 troops to be withdrawn from Germany, Poland, and Romania, sparking backlash from prominent senators, including Armed Services Committee Chair Roger Wicker (R-Miss).

The administration has clearly shifted priorities to the Indo-Pacific and the homeland. Trump wants the Europeans to do the heavy-lifting in Europe now. Indeed, this has been met with a relatively positive response from NATO allies. During the June NATO Summit in The Hague, NATO allies committed to increase spending on defense to 5% of GDP by 2035. This has been a success in the eyes of the Trump administration. NATO and global partners like Japan have sought to please Trump by catering to his defense demands, but also his personality. Let’s not forget when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called Trump “daddy” earlier this year.

The fact is that Europe’s traditional moderates and career politicians have been able to work with the President. This, however, does not mean Trump does not have his favorites when it comes to European partners. He has a budding friendship with Hungarian PM Viktor Orban, with whom he shares ideological alignment on combating “wokeness” and limiting migration. Both also share skepticism towards the European Union. And yet, for all the praise Trump and the MAGA movement has for Orban, he has shown to not be a straightforward partner. One thing the Trump administration does not like dating back to the first administration is China. And yet, while the rest of Europe has sought to grow economically independent of China, Orban’s Hungary, despite Fidesz’s anti-socialist zeal, has cozied up to Xi.

Chinese investment is increasing in Hungary. One of China’s top automakers, BYD, has their European R&D hub located in Hungary. In a July meeting with Chinese Business leaders, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Péter Szijjártó proclaimed that Hungary was proud to have become the top European investment destination for China. Hungary has also increasingly relied on Chinese loans, and has increased its security cooperation with the Xi regime, having signed an extradition treaty earlier this year. The administration seriously dislikes Chinese persecution, but such a treaty would make that persecution far easier in Hungary. Alarmingly, a Chinese intelligence official also reportedly met with Hungarian counterparts earlier this year, according to an investigation.

This poses a direct contradiction: Trump wants European allies who allow Washington to reduce its presence and focus eastward, yet his closest European friend is inviting Chinese economic and security influence into NATO territory.

Orban has also recently sought to push back against Trump by demanding an exemption from sanctions on Russian oil, which Hungary still heavily relies on. Trump promptly rejected the request, only to concede that he would look into it during a bilateral meeting with Orbán in early November. These sanctions could be a key way for the administration to pursue an elusive peace in Ukraine by pressuring the Russians. Accommodating Orbán (who faces a challenger in 2026), appears short-sighted. If Trump is serious about pressuring Putin and showing merciless economic pressure, such a strategy should not begin to make exceptions for friends of the administration who would still like to buy Russian energy.

Elsewhere in Europe, Germany’s far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) has seen splintering over defense policy. The party is divided between pro-NATO and Moscow-sympathetic factions. This fundamental break within the second-most popular political party in Germany as of the last elections is a problem. If Trump is serious about Europe taking charge of its own defense, Europe’s largest economy will have to take a leading role. A party that cannot form a coherent defense strategy will leave U.S. interests in Europe vulnerable. China has increasingly backed Russia, sending aid in its war in Ukraine and buying more Russian energy. A potential AfD government will have to reckon with this interconnectedness, and it does not appear ready to do so.

Other populist leaders, such as Marine LePen from the “National Rally,” have previously discussed courting Russia to drive a wedge between it and China. Yet such overtures to Russia rest on wishful thinking about the nature of the Sino-Russian relationship.

If U.S. policymakers seek to focus on China and the Western Hemisphere as the administration has signaled it will do, they will need European partners that make such objectives more achievable. Certain ideologically aligned leaders that court Moscow or rely on China for economic investment and internal security may threaten Washington’s Europe strategy. Populist alignment provides little material gain for the Trump administration. In an increasingly multipolar world, Washington needs European allies it can trust to handle their own backyard; not ones inviting in competitors through the side door.