Words Have Consequences: America, Europe, and the Cost of Credibility

This article is part of a two-part dialogue on the future of transatlantic relations. The accompanying part is found below.

This year’s Munich Security Conference was welcomed with relief by many European officials. Last year, Vice President Vance ignited panic among those in the transatlantic relationship with his scathing attacks on Europe on topics from migration to freedom of speech and the culture wars. This made Secretary of State Rubio’s leadership of the American delegation this year a welcome change. Rubio struck a conciliatory tone in his keynote speech while still making clear that the administration’s views on climate and immigration policy have not changed.  The Pentagon’s Undersecretary for Policy, Elbridge Colby, also reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Article Five and even argued that the transatlantic alliance is stronger than ever. But while Europeans can rest a little more easily for now, they are right to remain wary and concerned, especially when an administration’s foreign policy can change on a whim. Sam and I agree that the transatlantic relationship is untenable in its current form, but let me explain what that means to me.

The Fundamental Issue of a Relationship That Must Change

We agree that the transatlantic relationship in its current form is untenable. In a more competitive age, Europe has been too dependent on U.S. hegemony, especially for its security. It is true that for years, the United States footed the bill on European security. It is also true that this has bred complacency in Europe, because previous administrations had generally been liberal internationalists and principally adhered to the rules-based international order. That is no longer the case. This administration presents itself as “flexible realists” and pragmatic. But is it pragmatic for the administration to whip up fears that it will prey on its European partners to extract concessions from them through a manufactured diplomatic crisis like Greenland? Is it pragmatic to degrade, shame, and bully your primary trade partner? Some will argue that this “tough love” approach is what is needed to set Europe on the right course (more on that later); that Europe must be reminded that it can be strong, confident, and independent. 

In principle, the relationship is untenable because in a shifting geopolitical order, the West must adapt, and European dependency on American primacy is no longer sustainable. I think that this principle is widely agreed to on both continents. Furthermore, strengthening Europe would be a good thing for both parties, especially for the United States, which is keen to focus on competition with China. 

But if this were the sole case, it would merely be the status quo of the relationship, which is untenable. The core shared interests of both continents, like security, freedom, and prosperity, would theoretically remain the same. I believe, however, that this administration is not only recognizing the tenability of the status quo, but that it is also endangering the feasibility of the entire transatlantic relationship. The administration wants a Europe that is stronger, but it threatens tariffs against it when it doesn’t get its way. The administration wants a more independent Europe, but rails against European decarbonisation policies that would enhance European energy independence. The administration says one thing about the need for everyone to agree on a just and durable peace in Ukraine, but then goes it alone on negotiations that produce nothing. And this is not just about the treatment of Europe. What is untenable about the current relationship is the damage this does to American credibility and soft power, which depends on European backing. This administration presents itself as realist and pragmatic, but it is impossible not to accept the important roles that diplomacy, goodwill, and honesty play in interactions with allies with which you share more in common than in difference. The administration's inconsistent approach to Europe is weakening the strongest alliance in the world, an alliance that is essential in American competition against China, vital to securing the homeland, and critical to enhancing prosperity across nations. It is difficult to see how the United States can recover the trust and goodwill of its partners through a simple change of administration. The fundamental assumption of partnership is what is turning untenable in this current climate. 

Rhetoric, Values, and Policy

There is a valid argument to be made that the Trump administration’s approach to Europe, particularly its fiery, hard-nosed rhetoric, does not actually represent a fundamental change in policy. Indeed, presidents since before Trump have been asking for Europe to increase spending on Defense, with Obama having even called Europe complacent in 2016. Sam and others argue that the intention of the administration has not changed, but that it has had to be more aggressive in its wording and actions to get its point across. 

Perhaps it is true that the intention has not changed, but the fact is that there can be a great difference in the message that policymakers want to get across and the message that is received. Some argue that the United States, being the senior partner in this relationship, has to use tough rhetoric and be mean, as if it were a strict parent sternly disciplining their child who is not doing as they say. Rubio’s speech at the Munich Security Conference could be argued, to a certain extent, to have amounted to: “We hit you because we love you.”

If that is the logic that this administration is pursuing, then it should think again, because while it can argue that it just wants to kick Europe into high gear and forgo values-based policy, the mere rhetoric and attitude you project inherently affects policy on the other side of the Atlantic, precisely because the United States is the most powerful global actor. It is unwise for policymakers to assume that in the long term, Europeans will accept a patronizing tone because it is all supposedly just for show. And, even if it were all supposedly just rhetoric, the administration’s actions indicate otherwise. Trump surrogates actively fund far-right Eurosceptic parties that weaken Europe and get along with Moscow and Beijing. The administration threatens tariffs because of Greenland, rails against European regulatory frameworks, and attacks Iran without consultation with European partners, all while the “Board of Peace,” largely made up of the world’s autocrats, is happy to toe the line.    

Where Will This Lead Us?

The administration’s stated intention of reinforcing Europe, and the policies that it pursues, are inherently contradictory. This will fundamentally change the nature of the transatlantic relationship. It will not matter who occupies the Oval Office next, because there will always be the possibility of what comes after. That possibility sows long-term distrust, which is unsustainable in alliances that are supposed to be as integrated as ones like NATO. From a European perspective, this is both a problem and an opportunity. It is a problem in that Europe’s dependency on the United States makes it costly to decouple and reorient; it is an opportunity for Europe in that it can now seek ways to increase its autonomy, including by looking to assuage relations with China. 

In the United States, policymakers are not seeing the possibly overwhelming consequences. Yes, it may now more materially focus on competing with China and securing the Western Hemisphere. The question, however, is that when that credibility is gone, will you have those storied allies to call upon for help in a possible conflict? Will that trust exist? The administration is getting messages across, but it ought to be careful. There is a reason for wanting a responsible and restrained foreign policy empowered by burden-sharing, but there is also a reason to seek to preserve your role as leader of the free world, even if it means shouldering additional material responsibility. In the end, the cost of that responsibility could be dwarfed by the cost of alienating your allies, even if only through words.