Tough Love from America: The End of Managed Decline in the Atlantic Alliance

This article is part of a two-part dialogue on the future of transatlantic relations. The accompanying part is found below.

For decades, American leaders have been saying essentially the same thing to our NATO partners: NATO is rooted in common values and collective defense, but it can’t endure with an apathetic attitude towards defense spending. At the 2002 Munich Security Conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized that NATO had to remember it was “...fundamentally a military alliance.” He agreed that building democratic institutions and integrating new democracies into a wider West mattered, but they’d only be preserved if the alliance retained the military strength necessary to deter war credibly.

Twenty-four years later, in a very different geopolitical landscape, the United States is still making the same point at the same Munich Security Conference. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the U.S. and Europe “... belong together,” but America also wants “... allies who can defend themselves so that no adversary will ever be tempted to test our collective strength.” The American position has been remarkably consistent across administrations because it has always been rooted in preserving our transatlantic partnership. It is increasingly clear that the old transatlantic division of labor cannot endure in its present form.

I must first make a concession: Washington’s rhetoric can be abrasive, and abrasiveness has unpleasant diplomatic costs. But the deeper problem in U.S.-European relations didn’t begin with Donald Trump or his administration, nor can our allies claim ignorance in the flurry of accusations about European impotence. The more important question isn't whether the methods and rhetoric of current U.S. leadership are prudent, but whether the criticism itself is warranted. Regardless, it is undeniable that the existing arrangement has steadily drifted further from strategic realities.

From George W. Bush to Barack Obama, American Presidents post-Cold War consistently pressed European allies to maintain a higher standard of military readiness even against a geopolitically weakened Russia. In June 2001, George W. Bush spoke in Brussels that “...the decline in defense spending amongst NATO nations must be reversed.” He even made the point to not get caught up in the question of “...whether to buy American or buy European…” but was genuinely advocating first and foremost for a healthy procurement environment benefiting both sides. Secretary Robert Gates warned in 2011 of a “dim, if not dismal” future for the alliance if Europe kept under-investing. In 2014, Barack Obama pressed allies at Wales to achieve a modest 2% spending target for defense (only three countries did). 

So what, exactly, is untenable about America’s current relationship with Europe? 

Not Europe itself, but a relationship in which Europe - with its wealth and technological sophistication - derided hard power as uncouth and optional while the Americans maintained a large emphasis on tangible security investment. For years, Europe–especially Western Europe–benefited from the American nuclear umbrella and the preponderance of military credibility while believing an illusion that large-scale conventional conflicts would be a distant worry. That illusion has clearly been shattered by reality. The return of great-power competition, Russia’s illegal war against a NATO-aspirant country, plus decades of American signaling a strategic shift to China, have finally moved NATO members into action. By NATO’s 2024 D.C. Summit, 23 out of 32 countries in NATO were at 2 percent, and at the 2025  2025’s Hague NATO summit also saw an incredible spending pledge of 5% GDP by 2035, along with more countries making the 2% target.

That is real progress, but it is also an indictment.

Europe moved decisively only after decades of American pressure, and the shock of Russian aggression exposed how anemic European defense looked. Clearly, American policy should focus on encouraging our European partners to rebuild their capabilities, loved or unloved. 

So, is there a fundamental change in values? Mostly no. America doesn’t suddenly see Europe as an adversary or useless to our strategic needs, nor does Washington consider NATO members a geopolitical threat to the United States. It is better understood as a change in priorities and geopolitical circumstances that demands a strategic adjustment. In an era when the U.S. must make harder choices about where to prioritize finite strategic assets, Washington cannot afford a deficient partner complicating its geopolitical calculus. America’s 2022 National Defense Strategy calls China our “pacing challenge,” while still describing Russia as an acute threat. Washington has a structural incentive to demand that Europe handle more of Europe’s own defense burden, since a Europe that cannot carry more of the security burden forces Washington to make unnecessary strategic compromises in other theaters that matter more to long-term American interests. 

Europe’s own aspirations don’t conflict with this demand. Calls for ‘strategic autonomy,’ especially when voiced in defiance of American rhetoric or out of frustration with Washington, are not inherently contradictory to American interests if those calls produce more defense spending, greater industrial depth, fuller magazines, more spare parts, and a greater political willingness to fight. Washington should welcome them and not particularly care whether officials in Paris or Brussels justify new defense packages in the language of sovereignty, autonomy, or irritation with America, so long as those politics translate into real military capacity. Without demanding that the Europeans aggressively rearm, can Europe field the capabilities necessary to deter Russia, sustain Ukraine, achieve a semblance of ‘strategic autonomy,’ and defend the rules-based order it says it wants?  If the answer is no, then the old arrangement was merely comfortable for Europeans, with America paying the price for that comfort. This was the political dimension Secretary Gates foresaw fifteen years ago: He remarked in 2011 that sooner or later, U.S. leaders and voters would question whether the return on America’s investment in NATO justified such an unequal burden-sharing arrangement, warning of a ‘...dim, if not dismal future…” for the alliance. Trump’s rhetoric is less a break from past American thinking than the blunt political culmination of an unsustainable status quo.

Far from the worst fears of our European partners, the Americans have no intentions of leaving Europe while it is still woefully unprepared to stand on its own. Secretary Rubio, in the same 2026 address, stressed that weak allies make the U.S. weaker. The U.S. will embrace with open arms allies that can deter military aggression in Europe to allow for greater options in other theaters like the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East. A stronger Europe–even one that boasts of European autonomy and chafes at Washington’s rhetoric–is therefore not a political concession Washington makes to Brussels, but a strategic opportunity for sustaining a stable Eastern European theater, American power, and preserving a durable transatlantic balance. 

The future transatlantic relationship will be rougher, more reciprocal, and less sentimental, and that is okay. The U.S. will remain indispensable, while Europe will have to bolster its continental mass in areas like munitions, manpower, mobility, territorial defense, and industrial capacity. This is the right direction, and the United States should encourage movements in Europe that advocate for policies that advance these goals. An alliance in which Europe can actually credibly defend itself is the only version of Atlanticism that can survive an era of Russian revanchism and America’s Indo-Pacific strategic shift.

In an ideal world, Europe would’ve rearmed without Trump’s harshness. In an ideal world, years of private warnings from Washington would’ve sufficed. In an ideal world, allies shouldn’t have to embarrass one another in public to achieve what should’ve been obvious.  Unfortunately, we don’t live in that perfect world. For too long, Washington tried softer language and got too little in return. So, the United States has chosen the role of the strict father. It’s a thankless role, and no doubt some tact should be used to avoid pointless disputes. But the measure of this Transatlantic transition won’t be whether Europe appreciated the reprimand; it will be whether Europe finally became strong enough to stand on its own feet.

Change brings about uncertainty, but we should look forward to this evolution in the transatlantic relationship. President Ronald Reagan stated in 1984 that the U.S. and European security partners were bound by the same “loyalties, traditions, beliefs.” If Europe truly still believes this, let us embrace their newfound courage and continue to insist on stronger continental spending. The ball is now in Europe’s court to honor its commitments and show that it still wishes to stand as a capable partner in defending Western interests alongside the United States. The next chapter of our relationship must be secured together through renewed strength and reciprocity, or the alliance will erode under the familiar pressures of European complacency and American impatience.